{"id":3206,"date":"2025-12-11T18:45:28","date_gmt":"2025-12-11T18:45:28","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/trusteconomics.eu\/?p=3206"},"modified":"2025-12-11T18:45:28","modified_gmt":"2025-12-11T18:45:28","slug":"economic-dominance-why-is-trump-acquiring-golden-shares-in-critical-industrial-champions-in-the-us","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/trusteconomics.eu\/index.php\/2025\/12\/11\/economic-dominance-why-is-trump-acquiring-golden-shares-in-critical-industrial-champions-in-the-us\/","title":{"rendered":"Economic Dominance \u2013 Why is Trump acquiring “Golden” shares in critical industrial champions in the US?"},"content":{"rendered":"\r\n\r\nIn the first nine months of his second term, President Trump has overseen a government raid into the boardrooms of strategic corporations. Trump has unveiled a plan to weaken the dollar to boost U.S. exports and reduce its trade deficit with countries around the world, while attempting to rebuild the country\u2019s industrial base and restore jobs.\r\n\r\n \r\n\r\nIn a context of fragmentation where major geopolitical spaces will compete economically and militarily, the old rules of free trade do not seem to work \u2013 especially with the integration of the Asian space led by China.\r\n\r\n \r\n\r\nIn this context, regaining economic sovereignty is paramount.\r\n\r\n \r\n\r\nThe Moves to Reclaim Economic Sovereignty<\/strong>\r\n\r\n \r\n\r\nIn June, Trump demanded (and the federal government received) a so-called golden share in U.S. Steel, which effectively gives the White House veto power over much of the company\u2019s future planning. Two months later, the Trump administration bought a 10% stake in Intel, the once dominant American chipmaker now in the throes of a major crisis.\r\n\r\n \r\n\r\nSimilar stakes have followed in at least four other companies \u2014 including those that generate nuclear power or mine metals like lithium and copper, essential for making advanced semiconductors and batteries. Trump and his top officials have made it clear that they are just getting started. In August, he told reporters: \u201cI want to take as much as I can.\u201d\r\n\r\n \r\n\r\nWhat sets these moves apart from other federal efforts to subsidize, regulate, and control corporate decisions is the government\u2019s distinctly patriotic tone and the absence of any serious crisis as a pretext. Unlike the Obama-era bailouts of automakers, the Trump White House is not portraying these \u201cintrusions\u201d into corporate governance as temporary or unusual.\r\n\r\n \r\n\r\nThe Intel deal is about \u201cstrengthening our nation\u2019s economic sovereignty,\u201d Commerce Secretary Howard Lutnick said in August. The acquisition of a 10% stake in a small Alaskan mining company, the White House said in a statement, would \u201cprioritize economic growth and national security.\u201d\r\n\r\n \r\n\r\nOn the other side of the argument is a dangerous experiment that involves more centralized planning and puts taxpayer dollars and vital sectors of the economy at risk. So what\u2019s the word for this?\r\n\r\n \r\n\r\n“If socialism is the government owning the means of production,” said Rand Paul, famous for his liberal views, shortly after the announcement of the Intel deal, “then isn’t the government owning part of Intel a step toward socialism?”\r\n\r\n \r\n\r\nThe (forced) Republican turn<\/strong>\r\n\r\n \r\n\r\nDuring the Obama administration, conservatives were particularly sensitive to any suggestion of \u201csocialism,\u201d especially when it came from one of their own who wasn\u2019t strong enough in opposing the bailouts after the financial crisis or Obamacare. Times have changed, apparently.\r\n\r\n \r\n\r\nSpeaking about the Intel deal in the Oval Office on August 22, 2025, Trump offered a similar analogy from his time as a real estate developer, when he used \u201crestrictive covenants\u201d to limit how certain pieces of land could be used.\r\n\r\n \r\n\r\n\u201cWe have a restrictive covenant in certain industries,\u201d he explained. \u201cI will absolutely give someone the opportunity to do significant business that is good for us, as long as it doesn\u2019t hurt us from a security or military standpoint.\r\n\r\n \r\n\r\nAnd if I do that, I believe the country should pay a price.\u201d The expansion of executive branch powers in recent years may explain\u2014though not excuse\u2014why Trump thinks this way.\r\n\r\n \r\n\r\nConsider how then-President Joe Biden handled the proposed merger of U.S. Steel with Japan-based Nippon Steel. This was a deal between two private companies owned by shareholders around the world, and yet the Biden White House portrayed it as undermining a vital national security issue. In an executive order in January 2025, Biden claimed that there was \u201ccredible evidence\u201d that the deal would endanger U.S. national security. He did not specify what that evidence was. That gave Trump some leeway.\r\n\r\n \r\n\r\nThe new president had also opposed the merger during the campaign (and his running mate, J.D. Vance, was particularly vocally critical), but he was willing to make a deal. In June, Trump announced that he would allow Nippon to buy U.S. Steel, but with one condition: a \u201cgolden share\u201d in U.S. Steel to ensure federal control of the company.\r\n\r\n \r\n\r\nDocuments filed with the SEC in June clarified the details: Trump must provide \u201cwritten consent\u201d before U.S. Steel (which will continue to exist as a subsidiary of Nippon Steel) can change its name, relocate its headquarters, reduce or change planned investments, try to acquire part of a competing business, or \u201cclose, suspend, or sell\u201d existing plants.\r\n\r\n \r\n\r\nIn acquiring a stake in Intel, Trump once again twisted one of Biden’s economic interventions toward more direct federal control of an otherwise private company.\r\n\r\n
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\"\"<\/figure>\r\n<\/div> \r\n\r\n \r\n\r\n \r\n\r\nThe California-based chipmaker was a global leader in its field for many years, but recently it has fallen far behind companies like AMD and Nvidia, which are now producing smaller, faster, and more advanced chips.\r\n\r\n \r\n\r\nHoping to bolster Intel \u2014 and create a stronger domestic supply chain for key chips, many of which are currently made on the geopolitically sensitive island of Taiwan \u2014 the Biden administration made the company one of the main recipients of subsidies in the CHIPS and Science Act of 2022, which allocated $52 billion to subsidize microchip manufacturing.\r\n\r\n \r\n\r\nLast year, the White House approved more than $9 billion in subsidies for Intel, tied to the company\u2019s commitment to invest $100 billion in U.S. semiconductor manufacturing. Trump called the deal \u201cbad for taxpayers\u201d\u2014and it\u2019s hard to argue with that.\r\n\r\n \r\n\r\nThe subsidies also failed to slow Intel\u2019s decline\u2014its stock price lost 60% by 2024. But Trump didn\u2019t go so far as to separate Intel\u2019s future from taxpayers\u2019 pockets; he tied them up even tighter.\r\n\r\n \r\n\r\nIn August, the administration announced it would convert CHIPS and Science Act funding into Intel stock, effectively giving the White House a 10% stake in the company. In a press release announcing the acquisition, Lutnick said the deal shows \u201cthis administration remains committed to strengthening our nation\u2019s dominance in artificial intelligence while strengthening our national security.\u201d After that, the dam broke.\r\n\r\n \r\n\r\nBy mid-October, the government had acquired a 15% stake in MP Materials, 10% in Lithium Americas Corporation and 10% in Trilogy Metals. All are involved in key parts of the battery and semiconductor supply chain, from mining to manufacturing.\r\n\r\n
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\"\"<\/figure>\r\n<\/div> \r\n\r\n \r\n\r\n \r\n\r\nIn late October, the White House struck a deal with Westinghouse Electric, a now Canadian company that is seeking to build more nuclear reactors in the United States.\r\n\r\n \r\n\r\nIn exchange for financing and licensing these projects, Westinghouse will pay up to 20% of its future profits to the U.S. government, which also has an option to buy a 20% stake if the company goes public. And it seems unlikely to stop there. Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent said he \u201cwouldn\u2019t be surprised\u201d if the U.S. took equity stakes in more companies.\r\n\r\n \r\n\r\nAlthough he didn\u2019t name them, he added that the government had identified seven industries in which it should seek equity stakes in key companies.\r\n\r\n \r\n
    \r\n \t
  • Then there are the companies working on advanced computing and artificial intelligence.<\/li>\r\n \r\n \t
  • At least three companies working on advanced quantum computers are \u201ctalking about giving the Commerce Department equity stakes in exchange for federal funding, a sign that the Trump administration is expanding its interventions in what it sees as critical sectors of the economy.\u201d<\/li>\r\n<\/ul>\r\n \r\n\r\nBessent has hinted that Washington\u2019s central control of the economy could take other forms, including \u201cprice floors\u201d in \u201ca range of industries.\u201d\r\n\r\n \r\n\r\nWhat could go wrong? – Money\u2026 is going to die at Intel<\/strong>\r\n\r\n \r\n\r\nThe risks of all this should be obvious, says Norbert Michel, a vice president at the Cato Institute. \u201cIt\u2019s the federal government taking over and directing economic decisions that would normally be made in the private sector.\u201d\r\n\r\n \r\n\r\nBroadly speaking, there are two ways this could go wrong:\r\n\r\n \r\n\r\n1.<\/strong> The most obvious: What if the government makes a bad investment on behalf of taxpayers?\r\n\r\n \r\n\r\nWith Washington now in the command room, that risk reaches new levels, regardless of the administration\u2019s intentions or national security rhetoric.\r\n\r\n \r\n\r\nIf the government sees Intel\u2019s success as \u201cfundamental to the future of our nation,\u201d as Trump has said, then it is more likely to pour even more money into the company, even as the losses pile up. There is also the opportunity cost.\r\n\r\n \r\n\r\nWhat if another mining or semiconductor company comes along with better or more efficient methods but can\u2019t succeed in a market where the government has already chosen a \u201cnational champion\u201d?\r\n\r\n \r\n\r\n2.<\/strong> This leads directly to the second problem: when what happens in Washington becomes more important than what the company itself achieves.\r\n\r\n \r\n\r\nIntel has already warned investors about potential \u201cadverse reactions, immediate or over time,\u201d that could be caused by the federal government, which now owns a percentage of the company. Among them is the possibility that a changing political climate in Washington could alter or eliminate the company\u2019s direct line to government aid.\r\n\r\n \r\n\r\nHow does government ownership affect?<\/strong>\r\n\r\n \r\n\r\nIn the long run, this doesn\u2019t work out well for anyone. A 2024 World Bank study found that\r\n\r\n \r\n
      \r\n \t
    • companies in which the government owns at least 10% were, on average,<\/li>\r\n \r\n \t
    • 32% less productive than companies in the same industry.<\/li>\r\n \r\n \t
    • They were also 6% less profitable.<\/li>\r\n<\/ul>\r\n \r\n\r\nGovernment ownership \u201cappears to constrain the operational and financial performance of companies operating in competitive markets,\u201d the authors concluded.\r\n\r\n \r\n\r\nFederal officials will set prices and make investments based on political decisions, rewarding the best-connected political allies. This promotes what is good for them. Once you start down this path, the pressure is always to do more, not less. At some point, you no longer have a market economy.\r\n\r\n \r\n\r\nAnd since even universal price ceilings have been put on the table: \u201cIf we take Bessent seriously, we\u2019re already there.\u201d\r\n\r\n \r\n\r\nThe strategic sectors of the global economy<\/strong>\r\n\r\n \r\n\r\nHere lies another, even greater danger. It\u2019s hard to imagine Trump telling Elon Musk how to run SpaceX or that the president himself would decide the future of quantum computing without some serious technical advice. But government officials\u2014regardless of party\u2014generally have a very poor track record in choosing the companies and technologies of the future.\r\n\r\n \r\n\r\nMore recently, there has been a debate over which form of AI technology the government should choose to promote\u2014supercomputers (as Sam Altman has proposed) or grids of smaller chips (as Larry Ellison has suggested). The Biden administration has shown a strong preference for Altman\u2019s side.\r\n\r\n \r\n\r\nThe Trump administration now seems poised to swing to Ellison\u2019s side \u2014 funding smaller companies like Lightmatter and Cerebras, and reviving Intel\u2019s innovation efforts.\r\n\r\n \r\n\r\nThe federal government has never been particularly effective at picking winners \u2014 what\u2019s remarkable now is how comfortably both successive administrations seem to accept the idea that it must.\r\n\r\n \r\n\r\nIn 2019, the then-Trump administration officially declared that it wanted to \u201cdominate strategic sectors of the global economy.\u201d That phrase, popularized by Soviet leader Vladimir Lenin, supposedly expressed the administration\u2019s vast ambitions for AI, solar power, and quantum computing.\r\n\r\n \r\n\r\nToday, the phrase takes on a completely different character. The Trump administration is now working to nationalize a large number of companies in these very industries. It is essentially acquiring the industries themselves. So what is the driving force behind this?\r\n\r\n \r\n\r\nAnd in the background, economic warfare<\/strong>\r\n\r\n \r\n\r\nThe immediate answer lies in one of the Trump administration\u2019s most ambitious priorities: accelerating competition with China. From the White House\u2019s perspective, the market alone cannot create the kind of resilience that modern geopolitical realities require to protect the American economy.\r\n\r\n \r\n\r\nFor this reason, Trump has said that he wants America to continue to widen \u201cgaps that took 100 years to close\u201d with China in quantum computing and to avoid a \u201cSoviet-style collapse\u201d in artificial intelligence. And from that perspective, the shift toward state ownership almost makes sense.\r\n\r\n \r\n\r\nChina has a much larger and more centrally directed industrial policy that develops, subsidizes, and guides every step of its semiconductor ecosystem. The largest Chinese chip companies are state-owned, and all the big private tech companies \u2014 Alibaba, ByteDance, Tencent \u2014 are required to give the Chinese Communist Party a significant role in their governance.\r\n\r\n \r\n\r\nOver the past 40 years, this developmental capitalism has transformed China into a strategic global manufacturing hub for most of the world\u2019s key products \u2014 steel, batteries, rare earths, solar panels, electric vehicles, energy. Through this strategy, China has managed to displace American manufacturing in dozens of industries.\r\n\r\n \r\n\r\nTrump\u2019s economic team is even considering a complete ban on all imports of Chinese goods, a move that \u201ccould cause economic devastation in the United States\u201d due to the chaotic effects on the supply chain.\r\n\r\n \r\n\r\nAnd then there\u2019s his drive to expand state ownership. It is moving in much the same way that the Franklin Roosevelt administration moved before World War II \u2014 when it bought up factories, companies, and raw materials to speed up national security production, from steel to bauxite.\r\n\r\n
      \r\n
      \"\"<\/figure>\r\n<\/div> \r\n\r\n \r\n\r\n \r\n\r\nThe Morality of War in Economics<\/strong>\r\n\r\n \r\n\r\nIn 1941, philosophers like William James and political thinkers like Walter Lippmann argued that the United States should adopt a national plan that would function as \u201cthe moral equivalent of war\u201d \u2014 a system somewhere between capitalism and socialism, to compete with the faster-moving authoritarian regimes of the day. Back then, Roosevelt made it a reality.\r\n\r\n \r\n\r\nToday, Trump is attempting something similar \u2014 but in a very American way, and in a very different political context. All of which raises the fundamental questions:\r\n\r\n \r\n
        \r\n \t
      • What does Trump really want?<\/li>\r\n \r\n \t
      • What is the government\u2019s end game?<\/li>\r\n \r\n \t
      • What does success look like?<\/li>\r\n<\/ul>\r\n \r\n\r\nFor all the talk of national security and patriotic investment, many economists say Trump\u2019s program seems unstable and contradictory. It generously subsidizes companies operating in markets where demand and costs are constantly changing.\r\n\r\n \r\n\r\nSome of these businesses \u2014 like steel and rare earths \u2014 are notoriously cyclical, with rapid booms and equally rapid busts. And because the government is now taking a stake in them, the risk is amplified: taxpayers are now exposed to volatile returns that would normally be a risk for private investors.\r\n\r\n \r\n\r\nSo what does Trump really want? Perhaps an economy filtered through a national security lens, where the state has a strong hand but not complete control \u2014 where American companies are strengthened in strategic sectors but not entirely nationalized; an economy that resembles neither traditional liberalism nor the Chinese model, but something hybrid, unpredictable, and quintessentially American.\r\n\r\n
        \r\n
        \"\"<\/figure>\r\n<\/div> \r\n\r\n \r\n\r\n \r\n\r\nThe Political Tide<\/strong>\r\n\r\n \r\n\r\nThere is an irony here that cannot be ignored. Trump was elected\u2014and reelected\u2014by promising to \u201cdrain the swamp\u201d of Washington, to cut government waste, and to return control of the economy to ordinary Americans.\r\n\r\n \r\n\r\nAnd yet, his new industrial policy is creating a new, even bigger swamp: a swamp of corporate funds, subsidies, government stakes, and prices set by Washington.\r\n\r\n \r\n\r\nThe influence of the state is now seeping into sectors once considered bastions of private enterprise\u2014from artificial intelligence and nuclear power to metal mining and heavy industry.\r\n\r\n \r\n\r\nBut the bigger question remains:\r\n\r\n \r\n\r\nWhere does it stop?<\/strong>\r\n\r\n \r\n\r\nIn practice, there is no clear process for stopping this new wave of state capitalism.\r\n\r\n \r\n
          \r\n \t
        • Corporations are silent \u2014 either because they need the money or because they fear opposition.<\/li>\r\n \r\n \t
        • Congress remains paralyzed.<\/li>\r\n \r\n \t
        • The courts will hardly accept third-party appeals.<\/li>\r\n \r\n \t
        • And the parties seem eager to preserve the new tools of power for future use.<\/li>\r\n<\/ul>\r\n \r\n\r\nEven some socialists find something to like. Bernie Sanders has already supported Trump\u2019s moves to take government stakes in publicly funded companies \u2014 something he has openly called for since 2022.\r\n\r\n \r\n\r\nAt the same time, the few Republicans who dare to criticize this direction \u2014 such as Rand Paul and Thomas Massie \u2014 are under attack from within their own party, with Trump supporting his opponents in the primary elections.\r\n\r\n \r\n\r\nThere is a clear conflict here:\r\n\r\n \r\n\r\nThe free-market tradition within the Republican Party clashes with the emerging, bipartisan acceptance of state capitalism.\r\n\r\n \r\n\r\nTrump\u2019s economic gamble transcends the horizon of a presidency as he simultaneously reshapes the global and domestic economies \u2013 there will be many waves along the way, and it is uncertain whether the ship will reach port or sink in the middle of the ocean.\r\n\r\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

          In the first nine months of his second term, President Trump has overseen a government raid into the boardrooms of strategic corporations. Trump has unveiled a plan to weaken the dollar to boost U.S. exports and reduce its trade deficit with countries around the world, while attempting to rebuild the country\u2019s industrial base and restore … <\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[163],"tags":[52,153,640,1081,768,1082,1083,792],"class_list":["post-3206","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-corporates-businesses-industries","tag-china","tag-competition","tag-donald-trump","tag-economic-dominance","tag-globalization","tag-golden-share","tag-reagan","tag-socialism"],"aioseo_notices":[],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/trusteconomics.eu\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/3206","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/trusteconomics.eu\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/trusteconomics.eu\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/trusteconomics.eu\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/trusteconomics.eu\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=3206"}],"version-history":[{"count":1,"href":"https:\/\/trusteconomics.eu\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/3206\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":3207,"href":"https:\/\/trusteconomics.eu\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/3206\/revisions\/3207"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/trusteconomics.eu\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=3206"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/trusteconomics.eu\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=3206"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/trusteconomics.eu\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=3206"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}